Introduction
The literature is replete with striking cases of individuals who have witnessed signs of radicalisation to violence but failed to report or intervene. A review of literature reveals cases of such bystander behaviour such as the 2009 Fort Hood attack, where Nidal Hassan's colleagues noticed a drastic change in his worldview (McKinley & Dao, 2009) , and the 2016 Orlando Pulse nightclub shooting where the wife of Omar Mateen knew about her husband's intention to commit the attack (Tacopino, 2018) . In both cases, reports suggest that the individuals in question failed to intervene. The drastic consequences and the nature of the bystanders' non-reporting behaviours have continued to perplex authorities and raised new security concerns as these individuals, such as Hassan's colleagues or Mateen's wife, were in an ideal position to guide individuals in need of help to the relevant authorities. It could be argued that these individuals may have exhibited the bystander effect (Latané & Darley, 1970) , with regard to their lack of participation in reporting suspicious cases. In this context, bystander intervention in radicalisation incidents fall under the category of prosocial and helping behaviour -i.e., preventing the person of interest from harming themselves and others by reporting them in advance. Thus, Staub (2013) opines that bystanders play a determining role in the trajectory of future threats based on their degree of involvement.
Nonetheless, there also have been a few cases where signs of radicalisation came to the attention of authorities, and potential attacks were thwarted. For example, the attempt to target soldiers from Fort Dix in 2007 was pre-empted due to timely information provided by a member of public (Russakoff & Eggen, 2007) . However, there is a discrepancy in terms of the number of cases reported vs those that were not. Thus, insights into the (perceived or otherwise) obstacles that prevent these individuals from reporting and/or intervening, and suggestions for overcoming these barriers have clear practical significance.
The field of bystander effect and related intervention research has been the subject matter of a number of domains, including sexual violence (e.g., McMahon, 2015) , bullying (e.g., Pozzoli et al., 2012) , cyberbullying (e.g., Machackova et al., 2015) , whistle-blowing in organisation (e.g., Dozier & Miceli, 1985) , workplace bullying (e.g., Hellemans et al., 2017) , and dating aggression (e.g., Edwards et al., 2015) . In the domain of radicalisation, however, the topic of bystander effect and relevant interventions has been understudied (Schillinger, 2014; Williams et al., 2016) .
Given the current difficulties in countering radicalisation (e.g., limited manpower, difficulty in identifying and tracking person of interest by authorities), community reporting of suspected radicalisation to violence is an utmost necessity. This would facilitate the early identification of radicalised individuals, which involves procedures to ascertain whether the person of interest is in the nascent stages of radicalisation, and if one would further gravitate towards violent
There are Warning Signs that Bystanders Can Observe
While there is no standard violent extremist profile in terms of their socio-economic and educational backgrounds, there are tell-tale signs in terms of behaviours and beliefs, exhibited by individuals who are radicalised or are in the process of being radicalised 1 (Clutterbuck & Warnes, 2011; Neo et al., 2017b) . Individuals may show an observable range of warning signs that can be gleaned by others (Meloy et al., 2015) . For example, in the time leading up to an attack, Gill et al. (2014) found that people were aware of the grievances that caused the violence, the perpetrator's commitment to a specific radical ideology, and the perpetrator's intent to commit attacks. In fact, former assistant to the U.S. President for Homeland Security and Counter-terrorism, Lisa Monaco, had underscored the urgency to educate members of the public about the need to recognise and report suspicious activities:
In more than 80 percent of cases involving home-grown violent extremists, people in the community -whether peers or family members or authority figures or even strangers -had observed warning signs a person was becoming radicalised to violence. But more than half of those community members downplayed or dismissed their observations without intervening. (Monaco, 2014) .
The significance of community reporting as a way of thwarting potential attacks is further summed up by Pantucci et al. (2016, p. 15) , who stated that "the logic underlying a societal response is 1st Reading "9x6"
178 Learning from Violent Extremist Attacks that actors within that community such as doctors, social workers, librarians or even a neighbour may interact with potential lone actors and detect unusual behaviour". There are two implications arising from the finding that there are warning signs that bystanders can observe in most cases. Firstly, there is a need to identify and determine who these bystanders in question are. Based on interviews conducted with the law enforcement and Muslim communities in the United States, Williams et al. (2016) have identified close friends (more so than school counsellors, religious leaders, or family members) to be in the best position to notice early signs of radicalisation. Similar results were also seen in the Singapore context. Results from a survey of 254 participants 2 revealed that close friends and family members were deemed most likely to notice early signs of individuals becoming radicalised (see Figure 10 .1; Neo, 2016) . Understandably, there is therefore a need to 2 The participants were all Singaporeans who were administered the survey using Google Forms. Participation is voluntary and the participants range from 18 to 73 years old. In terms of gender, 123 participants are male and 131 are female. At the time of writing, more studies are being conducted by the authors to gather more data and validate the current findings. (Neo, 2016 Furthermore, unlike conventional bystander effect studies, where there is a clear demarcation of who the victim and the perpetrator are, it may not be the case in the context of radicalisation (Fox et al., 2016) . To begin with, is the individual viewed as a victim of radicalisation or a potential perpetrator of violence? These are essential questions because an individual's likelihood of intervention is influenced by how he/she perceives the person of interest. For example, if people perceive the radicalised individual to be a "victim" who is in need of help and misguided (whom they may be inclined towards protecting from punishment) rather than as a "perpetrator", they are more likely to report the individual to the relevant authorities. However, there are certain situational barriers that the bystanders have to surmount first before they can do so.
There are Barriers that Bystanders have to Overcome before Reporting
The term "bystander effect" was first coined by social psychologists Latané and Darley (1970) in the wake of the Genovese case. In 1964, Kitty Genovese was brutally murdered outside her apartment as 38 neighbours -i.e., bystanders -witnessed but did not come to her assistance (Lurigio, 2015) . In an attempt to understand why individuals Latané and Darley (1970) conducted seminal work to identify the barriers and psychological processes that influence a bystander's decision to take action, and proposed a five-step bystander intervention model: (i) notice an event, (ii) interpret the event as an emergency, (iii) assume responsibility for intervening, (iv) know how to intervene, and (v) intervene. The successful completion of all five steps can potentially lead an individual to perform helping behaviour (for review, see Dovidio et al., 2006) . In contrast, situational factors such as the presence of other individuals may interfere with the successful completion of these steps, and contribute to errors in decision-making at each step (Anker & Feeley, 2011) . For example, the bystander effect emerges when bystanders fail to notice the event, do not interpret the event as an emergency, do not accept the responsibility to help, and have little knowledge of how to help. In fact, results from a meta-analysis conducted by Fischer et al. (2011) corroborated these findings and identified several other factors that may be related to the decreased likelihood of helping behaviour. For instance, the likelihood of helping decreases when bystanders fear that their helping behaviours may be evaluated negatively by non-intervening bystanders -e.g., running the risk of embarrassment and ridicule for misinterpreting the event as one that requires assistance (van den Bos et al., 2009) , facing potential retaliation from perpetrator (Madfis, 2014) , and getting themselves or the victim in trouble (Zhong, 2010) . This may lead the bystander to "diffuse" and shift his/her responsibility for intervention to other bystanders, which in turn inhibits helping.
However, it is important to distinguish radicalisation from conventional types of domains studied (e.g., sexual violence, bullying) in the bystander effect literature, including its frequent occurrence behind closed doors, and how it may not be perceived as an emergency due to the long period of time it takes for someone to become radicalised (Fox et al., 2016) .
Nevertheless, many of the barriers of bystander action in radicalisation are found to be similar to barriers documented in the general bystander effect literature (Neo, 2016; Williams et 2016). Given that the potential bystanders are likely to be close friends and family members of the person of interest (as highlighted earlier), they may be the least willing to report their suspicions due to fear of: (i) damaging their relationship with the individual, (ii) putting the individual in danger from policing officials, and (iii) putting themselves in danger from policing officials (Williams et al., 2016) . Similarly, in his research on bystander effect in violent extremism in Singapore, Neo (2016) found that the top four most endorsed reasons for not taking positive action after witnessing signs of radicalisation were all associated to some sort of fear (see Figure 10 .2). Taken as a whole, these findings suggested that the authorities should not expect this group of bystanders (i.e., close friends and family members with whom relationships are primarily built upon genuine and mutual concern) to overcome these fears and report the person of interest easily (Williams et al., 2016) . The act of reporting entails the risk of harming treasured personal relationships. Furthermore, it is logical to assume that this group of bystanders is less likely to correctly recognise signs of radicalisation. For example, they may not believe that their friend/family member is serious about (Neo, 2016 [I]nsofar as violent extremism carries a stigma, the degree to which associate-gatekeepers [bystanders] identify with someone, whom they observe engaging in behaviours potentially indicative of violent extremism, the more that such gatekeepers might 'turn a blind eye' toward, or otherwise excuse, those behaviours.
It therefore suggests that the fear of mislabelling and stigmatising one's friend/family member as a potential violent extremist may lead the bystander to discount the severity or presence of the warning signs, thereby decreasing his/her likelihood to report. Thus, with respect to overcoming bystanders' reluctance to intervene, there is a need to first circumvent the element of fear associated with reporting and offer them a safe platform to do so (Neo, 2016) . Firstly, given the sensitivities involved (e.g., fear of getting it wrong and damaging relationship with individual), it is reasonable to assume that members of public may find it challenging to cooperate (i.e., reporting) with authorities. Therefore, there is a need for the relevant authorities to reach out and provide reassurances to the public that investigations concerning radicalisation will be carried out professionally. For example, bystanders who report must be assured that they are reporting for the benefit and safety of the individual and the wider community, and that they are not condemning a friend/family member to life in prison (Ramalingam, 2014) . In addition, individuals would not be penalised for reporting false positives as long as the intention to report is not frivolousi.e., with regard to the fear of being identified and getting it wrong. Exit and rehabilitation programs for radicalised individuals must also be communicated to the public so that the bystanders would know that by reporting, the person of interest would receive the help that he/she requires. Akin to the Yellow Ribbon Project for ex-offenders in Singapore (see Abdullah, 2017) , authorities could also share success stories of rehabilitated violent extremists turning their lives around and making meaningful contributions to the society. Secondly, the utilisation of anonymous reporting channels 3 may help to mitigate the perceived risk of being identified; similar efforts in the whistle-blowing literature have also been found to be effective in overcoming the negative consequences of the bystander effect (e.g., Gao et al., 2015) . Furthermore, such channels of reporting should be made easily accessible to the public, with the platforms being simple for the community to use. In Singapore, the SGSecure mobile app was introduced in September 2016 for Singaporeans to submit information on any incident(s) relating to violent extremism (Chew, 2016) . Besides serving as an easily accessible platform for users to upload photo, video, or text descriptions about suspicious incidents or objects, it also provides useful guidelines (e.g., what suspicious behaviours to look out for, what to do if you are caught in an attack, making it easier for bystander to take notice of a crisis/ emergency and help) for Singaporeans, and updates about the latest situation in the event of major emergencies.
Although each of these respective suggestions may enhance the likelihood of intervention, it is important for authorities not to overuse responsibility messages to hold members of public responsible for their friends'/family members' behaviour, thereby instilling a sense of guilt if they fail to do so.
The Approach of Guilt-tripping the Bystanders Will not Work
There are many situations in which reporting is perceived as a form of ethical action (e.g., Fredricks et al., 2011) . While it is easy to hold someone accountable and responsible for their friends'/family members' actions, it may not be perceived as "fair" in the eyes of these individuals as they may have also been deeply affected by their friends'/family members' behaviours (e.g., the loss of a child after he/ she travelled to the Middle East to join the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Muslims feeling stigmatised by the rest of the community). In their engagements with the Muslim community in the United Kingdom, Awan and Guru (2017) observed that many parents were presented with such a dilemma. These parents faced the possibility of alienating their own children by providing the authorities with information about their children. McVeigh (2014) also highlighted a similar case where a parent, at the behest of police to engage the authorities if they observed warning signs, regretted reporting her son to the police when he returned from Syria as her son subsequently received a 12-year jail sentence. Even in the non-radicalisation setting, Gao et al. (2015) found that whistle-blowing intentions of executives and upper management, as compared to lower-level employees, are hindered by their sense of responsibility to not disclose fraud occurrences in order to protect the reputation of the company.
To understand this relationship better, Neo (2016) utilised the first four steps of the bystander intervention model by Latané and Darley (1970) to understand the perceptions that Singaporeans may have about reporting those who exhibit signs of radicalisation to the appropriate authorities. Based on the findings 4 collected from 254 participants, there was a surprising positive relationship between step 1 (noticing an event) and step 4 (know how to help). Further statistical analysis using structural equation modelling (SEM) was performed to parse out the relationships between the four steps (see Figure 10. 3). Results suggested that there is a strong relationship between step 1 (noticing an event) and step 4 (know how to help), and a weak relationship between step 3 (assume responsibility for intervening) and step 4 (know how to help). This suggests the possibility that (i) the intention to perform helping behaviour (i.e., reporting) in the radicalisation context may not follow the usual sequential fashion of the bystander intervention model and (ii) the weak relationship between steps 3 and 4 may be attributed to the presence of other factors such as the dilemmas the bystander experienced between wanting to help the potentially radicalised individual and reporting the individual to the authorities. 3 4 5 6 7 8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36 b3394 Learning from Violent Extremist Attacks "9x6" 1st Reading
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More importantly, the findings presented herein points specifically to the importance of not "guilt-tripping" the bystanders by holding them responsible for their friends'/family members' behaviour -i.e., based on the weak relationship between step 3 (assume responsibility for intervening) and step 4 (know how to help). The findings advance the idea that outreach efforts should focus on providing opportunities for bystanders to report if they witness signs of radicalisation (i.e., based on the strong relationship between step 1 (noticing an event) and step 4 (know how to help)), and providing reassurances to them that they are reporting for the benefit and safety of the person of interest and the wider community. In other words, the individuals' likelihood to report increases if they are simply asked to do so whenever they witness signs of radicalisation. Anker and Feeley (2011) found similar results. By simply providing students with the opportunity to register as organ donors, students' intentions to donate in the future were increased.
Additionally, to overcome the bystander intervention inertia, outreach efforts have to provide information that is simple and easy 
Educate Bystanders That the Threat Posed by Radicalised Individuals is Severe
A major concern about reporting signs of radicalisation is the ambiguity of the phenomenon itself. There is a wide range of behaviours involved, and depending on each individual, these behaviours may be manifested differently in terms of their severity and violence. On the one hand, there are behaviours that would generally be considered as obvious "red flags" or high-risk situations, including the expressions to kill and the desire for martyrdom (Kebbell & Porter, 2012) . These behaviours are recognised as credible warning signs that radicalised individuals may espouse before they perpetuate an attack. It is therefore reasonable to fathom that the bystanders would classify the presence of these signs as an emergency. On the other hand, there are behaviours that contribute to the nascent stages of radicalisation (low-risk situations) including the expression of intolerance towards a particular group, the use of the Internet to search for radical propaganda, etc. (Neo et al., 2017a) . The behaviours at this end of the spectrum are less obvious, and therefore their connection to radicalisation may not be recognised nor judged as an emergency. As a result, radicalisation can be more difficult for the bystanders to notice than an overt emergency situation (e.g., murder) like the one highlighted in Latané and Darley's (1970) Hence, there is a need to educate the bystanders that the threat posed by radicalised individuals is severe (i.e., one is one too many) and that it is a form of emergency. Indeed, bystander effect research on alcohol overdose in college students (Blavos et al., 2014) and sexual harassment (Fischer et al., 2006) have shown that bystanders are motivated by the perceived severity of the situation (e.g., the victim may die) to render assistance. As explained by Fischer et al. (2006, p. 269) , [W] e assume that dangerous emergencies are recognised as real emergencies more clearly and thus increase the costs for not helping the victim. As a consequence, the bystander's empathic arousal increases, which finally leads to more helping -independently of whether the bystander is alone or accompanied by other bystanders.
Similarly, the extent to which bystanders' behaviour may be moderated by the severity of the situation is also seen in the survey study by Neo (2016) . It was revealed that the scenario where one observes an individual mentioning his/her "intention to commit violence" (i.e., high-risk situation) would trigger more participants to report, as compared to another scenario in which the individual only exhibits early signs of radicalisation (i.e., low-risk situation). Interestingly, participants expressed less concern about getting their friends/family members in trouble, as well as damaging their relationship with them in the high-risk situation. In both high-and low-risk situations, however, the participants are still equally concerned about getting themselves into trouble (see Figure 10 .4). It could be that these participants in the high-risk situation have appreciated the severity of the situation, which resulted in their increased intentions to report, despite the potential of getting themselves into trouble.
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Firstly, it provides guidance on how outreach efforts should be tailored in ways that articulates what are clear warning signs of radicalisation (i.e., associated with high-risk situation) where the bystanders can intervene upon recognition. There is also the need to impress upon the bystanders to interpret situations, where such signs of radicalisation are salient, as emergencies that require their actions. This in turn may increase the opportunities for individuals to become "positive" bystanders that help guide the person of interest away from becoming radicalised. For example, in the Press Release by the Ministry of Home Affairs on 12 June 2017, it was mentioned that:
The heightened terrorism threat worldwide and in Singapore makes it imperative for family members and friends to raise to the authorities anyone they suspect of being radicalised or planning terror activities. Singapore can be made safer if family members and friends do this. The time between radicalisation and committing violence can be very short in some cases. Recent terror attacks around the world have shown how terrorists can use easily available objects like vehicles and knives to commit violence. Such an act would drive a wedge between Muslims and non-Muslims and divide our communities, which is precisely what the terrorist groups want (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2017, para. 5). Secondly, there is a need to establish outreach programs that consider the level of general knowledge that the public may have about the topic of radicalisation; in fact, there are many examples where members of public did not understand basic concepts associated with radicalisation (see Awan & Guru, 2017) . For instance, they may misconstrue a practising Muslim as a potential violent extremist. This may alienate the affected community and negatively affect social cohesion. Thus, programs should (i) address the roles of a positive bystander, (ii) challenge myths and misconceptions about radicalisation, (iii) share signs of radicalisation, and (iv) recognise and reinterpret bystander intervention for radicalisation as events that affect the community. This would also shape public perceptions towards radicalisation and generate greater awareness about the threat it poses. However, there is a need to first create a safe and conducive culture which encourages reporting, in order for such outreach programs to work.
Create A Culture Where Reporting is the Norm
Safeguarding against the threat of radicalisation is everyone's responsibility. Indeed, a key counter-radicalisation initiative adopted by many countries is to foster and enhance the cooperation between the government and the public (Dunn et al., 2016; Spalek, 2014) . Such community engagements may have a positive influence on eliciting bystander actions if there is an established level of confidence and trust between the two entities; members of public would be more willing to share information about any potential radicalisation activities. For example, Pantucci et al. (2016, p. 16) However, if members of public perceive the authorities to be unjust and untrustworthy (e.g., due to racial prejudice), they will demonstrate an unwillingness to come forward with important but potentially incriminating information (Awan, 2012; Weitzer & Tuch, 2004) . In such circumstances where the authorities are viewed with suspicion, members of public would likely react in a similar manner as what Uzma Hussain did: "I would not call them because the police might just come knocking on my door and arrest my other children. Hard to trust them" (Awan & Guru, 2017, p. 34) . These examples therefore underscore the importance of building a culture that embraces the cooperation and trust between the government and the public, which in turn may encourage bystanders to intervene in a positive manner.
Besides building trust, recent studies have identified other factors that may facilitate the creation of a positive culture for bystander actions. For example, studies have found that social norms and perception of cohesiveness have a strong influence on bystander intervention. Cantillon's (2006) analysis of youth delinquency found that members of the neighbourhood are more likely to offer assistance when they feel a greater sense of social and emotional connection to their neighbours. Group membership is also a contributing factor, where people are more likely to intervene when those who require assistance are perceived to be an in-group member (Levine & Manning, 2013) . Similarly, Rutkowski et al. (1983) shared how a program was able to stimulate bystander responsiveness in New York City by fostering the sense of community cohesiveness. Thus, the notion of a shared common identity may translate into cultural norms about how each individual should react in bystander situations.
This conclusion supports the potential use of a collective identity, which members of public can relate to, in outreach programs. For example, by engaging all Singaporeans, including the authorities and those who may become radicalised in outreach programs, people can be reminded of their shared membership as members of the Singapore community. In addition, outreach programs should reiterate that acts of radicalisation are not only wrong, immoral, and illegal, but antithetical to the Singaporean national identity shared by all citizens. An example would be the "Stand United" messaging that was shared as part of the national SGSecure movement (Seow, 2017) . Besides emphasising the need for Singaporeans to build strong ties with their neighbours and the community, it also underscores an equally essential message for Singaporeans to maintain the ties and look out for one another especially after an attack. However, implementing such programs is challenging as trust 5 between the government and members of public must be engendered (as highlighted earlier), and steps taken to ensure the public can accurately identify concerning behaviour.
Other bystander effect studies (e.g., Abbate et al., 2013; Garcia et al., 2002) have determined that pre-emptive approaches such as the priming of individuals with helping-related words would increase their likelihood to engage in bystander action. This approach is based on the premise that the willingness to provide help for the sake of others can be activated at the subconscious level (White & Malkowski, 2014) . In other words, authorities would be well advised to prime the public to act on the needs and well-being of other members of their community. In light of these findings, outreach programs can incorporate the use of priming to emphasise the importance of helping (e.g., "by reporting (the person of interest), you are helping him/her receive the assistance that he/she requires"). This positive framing may also reinforce the assertions identified earlier: (i) individuals' likelihood to report increases if they are simply asked to do so whenever they witness signs of radicalisation and (ii) individuals are more willing to help others who share the same group membership. These suggestions have the potential to 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36 b3394 Learning from Violent Extremist Attacks 1st Reading "9x6"
192 Learning from Violent Extremist Attacks play a critical role in creating a culture where reporting is the norm; all members are willing and able to intervene and become active in reporting signs of radicalisation.
Conclusion
The current state of violent extremism makes community reporting of suspected radicalisation to violence absolutely essential. This report, therefore, seeks to answer the question of how to encourage the community not to "stand by" (i.e., be bystanders) and report more. Based on the insights derived from a behavioural sciences angle, five key points and their associated implications for law enforcement practitioners, policymakers, and academics have been identified . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36 b3394 Learning from Violent Extremist Attacks "9x6" 1st Reading
